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Abstract 
From a conventional monological view, meaning-making is located in a particular statement. In conventional schools, 
students are positioned to be enactors of ready-made knowledge and skills on teacher’s demand based on their pattern-
recognition and production, rather than to be authors of their own education, learning, knowledge, and meaning. Pattern 
recognition involves the emergence of active production of diverse potential patterns that may or may not approximate 
well the targeted pattern (“sprouting”). The sprouting can be guided (“supervised”) by an expert or unguided, mediated 
or unmediated. These diverse potential patterns are sequentially evaluated about how likely each of them can be close 
to the targeted pattern. In each evaluation, the probabilistic confidence of some patterns grows while some other 
patterns decrease. In contrast, according to Bakhtin, meaning-making is defined as the relationship between a genuine, 
interested, information-seeking, question and serious response to it. From the Bakhtinian dialogic perspective, a 
statement does not have any meaning until it is viewed as a reply to some question in an internally persuasive 
discourse. A student’s meaning-making process starts with a genuine, interested, information-seeking, question raised 
by the student. At least, when a student cannot yet formulate this genuine question, they have to be pregnant with such 
a question, experiencing a certain puzzlement, uneasiness, curiosity, tension, and so on. Another aspect of dialogic 
meaning-making is interaddressivity. A student is interested in other people: 1) in what other people may think and how 
they feel about it; however these people define this it, and 2) in other people as such – in what they are doing, feeling, 
relating, and thinking about; in the relationship with these people; in the potential that these people may realize and 
offer; and so on. 
Eugene Matusov is a Professor of Education at the University of Delaware. He studied developmental 
psychology with Soviet researchers working in the Vygotskian paradigm and worked as a schoolteacher 
before immigrating to the United States. He uses sociocultural and Bakhtinian dialogic approaches to 
education. His recent books are: Matusov, E. (2017). Nikolai N. Konstantinov’s authorial math pedagogy 
for people with wings, Matusov, E. & Brobst, J. (2013). Radical experiment in dialogic pedagogy in higher 
education and its Centauric failure: Chronotopic analysis, and Matusov, E. (2009). Journey into dialogic 
pedagogy. 
 
My central thesis in this essay is that learning in conventional and many progressive schools mainly 
involves individual or social pattern-recognition and pattern-production, patched and facilitated with 
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occasional dialogic meaning-making1 process (as it often happens in constructivist progressive teaching).  
Let me provide an example. I frequently asked my undergraduate college students, future teachers, what 
they learned deeply in school and are proud of learning. Often, many of my students pick up adding fractions 
with different denominators, like 1/2 + 1/32. They usually feel very proud to demonstrate the math procedure 
of multiplying both the nominator and denominator of 1/2 by 3 and both the nominator and denominator of 
1/3 by 2 to make the common denominator 6 and then add the new, transformed, fractions 3/6 and 2/6 
together to get 5/6. So far, so good. But then, I ask them why we cannot do simpler addition by adding the 
two nominators 1 and 1 together and by adding the two denominators 2 and 3 together to get 2/5. My 
students usually say that it would be the wrong addition of the fraction. I ask them what makes the first 
addition of fractions that they did right and while the second addition that I did wrong.  
This is where the most interesting thing starts because my students rarely can answer this question. 
Many of them get angry at me for “tricking them.” They say, “It’s forbidden.” I ask, “By whom?” They say, 
“You will fail a test.” I suggest, “Why don’t we change the tests.” And so on. Finally, I ask my students how 
and why humans, humankind, came to this strange rule of adding fractions. They do not know. In my view, 
the main problem is not that my students do not know many things about the addition of fractions, but the 
problem is that many of them have never been set on a journey of understanding about fractions. Rather, 
it seems that many of them were conditioned to produce a certain pattern of actions, approved by the school 
authority (and beyond). 
A similar question in science often brings an answer that the Earth is round – a scientific fact that 
many of my students, future teachers, claimed that they knew well. When I ask them how they know that it 
is true, my students often say that they learned it from their science textbooks. When I ask how the textbook, 
the scientists, the humankind know for sure that it is true. At best, my students could tell me that humans 
can see the Earth from space. I often counter-argued that humans knew that the Earth was round long 
before they could go to space – but how did they know? For the vast majority of my students, these 
questions were new. 
In my view, the issue here is not necessarily that most of my college students have experienced a 
particularly poor instruction and particularly bad teachers. The problem seems to be that apparently, 
something is very rotten with conventional schools themselves.  Although a conventional teacher can teach 
my students to answer my questions correctly, still the problem will reemerge when new, “tricky,” questions, 
unexpected by the students, arrive. In conventional3 schools, students are positioned to be enactors of 
ready-made knowledge and skills on their teachers’ demand, rather than to be authors of their own 
education, learning, and knowledge. Let me illustrate this point by considering experiments by the famous 
Soviet cultural-historical psychologists Luria and Vygotsky (Luria, 1976; Vygotsky & Luria, 1993) that were 
then critically re-thought by the American psychologist Scribner (1977). 
The issue of whether the meaning-making process is rooted in pattern-recognition or in dialogue is 
very important because it defines the nature of education: either mostly monological or mostly dialogical. 
 
1 In this essay, I use the terms “meaning-making” and “sensemaking” interchangeably and synonymously. I should probably have 
used the term “sensemaking” to be exact, but I follow the conventional term “meaning-making,” which is often used in place of 
“sensemaking.” For the purpose of this essay, I am not going to distinguish the terms “meaning” and “sense.” 
2 The other common learnings are: 1) the fact that the Earth is around, 2) the explanation of the seasons, and 3) the explanation of 
the Moon’s phases. Like in the case of the adding fractions with different denominators, not only these learnings are usually 
conventional but also are full of misconceptions (especially for #2 and #3). 
3 I use the term “conventional” here in two different ways. The first is as a synonym of “mainstream”. The second is schools, which 
pedagogy is based on socializing students in conventionality (see my notion of "conventional knowledge" in contrast to "conceptual 
knowledge," Matusov, 2009). 
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Unpacking schoolish pattern-recognition 
In the early 1930s, Aleksandr Luria went to Soviet Asia to conduct psychological experiments with 
the illiterate and unschooled local population, comparing them to their literate and schooled neighbors. 
Vygotsky and Luria (1993) expected to find evidence of qualitative differences in the participants’ 
psychological functions such as cognition because they believed that literacy and school provide people 
with new psychological mediational tools, which transform their cognition and other psychological functions. 
The results of the experiments seemed to confirm the Vygotsky-Luria hypothesis about cognitive mediation 
by cultural tools. They found that, in contrast to literate schooled local activists, illiterate, unschooled adults 
could not solve logical syllogisms – the concept invented by Aristotle: 
[Syllogism] In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white. Novaya Zemlya is in the Far 
North and there is always snow there. What color are the bears there? 
1. Illiterate Unschooled Peasant: ...We always speak only of what we see; we don't talk about what 
we haven't seen. 
2. Experimenter: ...But what do my words imply? [The syllogism is repeated.] 
3. P: Well, it's like this: our tsar isn't like yours, and yours isn't like ours. Your words can be answered 
only by someone who was there, and if a person wasn't there, he can't say anything on the basis of 
your words. 
4. E: ...But on the basis of my words – in the North, where there is always snow: the bears are white, 
can you gather what kind of bears there are in Novaya Zemlya?  
5. P: If a man was sixty or eighty and had seen a white bear and had told about it, he could be 
believed, but I've never seen one and hence I can't say. That's my last word. Those who saw can 
tell, and those who didn't see can't say anything! (At this point a young [schooled] Uzbek [Communist 
activist] volunteered, "From your words it means that bears there are white.")  
6. E: Well, which of you is right?  
7. P: What the cock knows how to do, he does. What I know, I say, and nothing beyond that! (Luria, 
1976, pp. 108-109). 
Vygotsky and Luria argued that the illiterate, unschooled peasant could not abstract from his 
everyday experiences and did not possess the cognitive abilities of hypothetical thinking. However, later, 
American psychologist Sylvia Scribner (1977) re-analyzed the case and pointed out that the illiterate, 
unschooled Uzbek peasant demonstrated his hypothetical thinking perfectly well when he argued, “If a man 
was sixty or eighty and had seen a white bear and had told about it, he could be believed, but I've never 
seen one, and hence I can't say” (see turn 5 above). The peasant used abstract thinking to refuse to 
cooperate – to play the formal logic game – with the unknown adult researchers who come as some kind 
of authority to impose their test on him. Scribner also showed that the illiterate Uzbek peasant demonstrated 
abstract and generalizable thinking as well, although different than what Vygotsky and Luria expected. 
Thus, the reason, for which the illiterate, unschooled peasant rejected the syllogism premise, “In the Far 
North, where there is snow, all bears are white,” was not rooted in “imprisonment by everyday experiences” 
and a lack of abstract and hypothetical thinking, as Vygotsky and Luria thought, but in something else.  
Scribner attracted our attention to the fact that the syllogism premise, as probably all syllogism 
premises, does not make much sense outside of this syllogism game. Indeed, what does it mean, “In the 
Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white”? Who said that? Are those people trustworthy? What 
does it mean “all”? Is it about (somebody else’s) past or about everybody’s future? What if somebody brings 
a black bear to the Far North, would the Far North stop being the Far North or would snow disappear? What 
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if non-white bears exist or existed in the Far North, but we do not know that yet? And so on. The premise 
is arbitrary (although often not random).  
Scribner turned the table around: instead of considering the strange peculiarity of illiterate, 
unschooled society, we should focus on the strange peculiarity of schooled societies. In a clever research, 
Scribner and her colleague Cole (1981) disentangled literacy and schooling and came to a conclusion that 
it is schooling and not literacy per se that is responsible for the phenomenon observed by Luria. Interestingly 
enough, Aristotle abstracted the formal logic and the notion of syllogism from the teaching practice of 
sophists – Ancient Greek teachers of wealthy Athenian youth. Sophists tutored young aristocrats for pay 
how to win arguments in democratic debates by focusing on the rhetoric and form of the arguments rather 
than on their content. The content-free logic (and logical traps) allowed sophists to teach young aristocrats 
from different political parties, regardless of their political ideology, in contrast to teachers who focused on 
the content of the political arguments and, thus, who had a more limited pool of their students. Teaching 
the formal logic was economically more profitable and politically safer than teaching the content logic 
developed by Socrates in democratic Athens. The issue is why this strange practice spread beyond 
democratic Ancient Athens. 
It seems that what people learn in school is not so much new cognitive mediational tools, as 
Vygotsky and Luria argued, but rather a peculiar ability to seamlessly abstract or decontextualize from their 
own meaningfulness, rooted in meaning-making critical questions, and uncritically accept any arbitrary 
premise imposed by the authority. In my upcoming book, I try to address the important issue of why 
conventional school does that and what role it serves in our society (and what “our society” means) 
(Matusov, 2020, in press). In this essay, I will continue exploring the peculiarity of learning in conventional 
schools. 
I argue that this type of learning, alienated from the student’s own meaning-making process, is 
mainly rooted in the pattern-recognition and pattern-production processes, guided by the authority’s 
approval or disapproval. Such patterns may involve cognitive, such as in syllogistic problem solving, 
discursive, as in talking about invisible electrons, action patterns, as when adding fractions with different 
denominators, perceptional patterns, as when seeing 4 in the 2+2 statement, communicational patterns, 
e.g., not talking until allowed by the teacher, power patterns, such as unconditionally accepting any question 
or any assignment demanded by the teacher, and so on. Students have to recognize patterns desirable by 
the authority and successfully produce them as judged by the authority. Of course, pattern-recognition and 
pattern-production occur outside of conventional school. Furthermore, one can legitimately argue that 
pattern-recognition and pattern-production are ubiquitous and omnipresent. Yes, but pattern-recognition 
and pattern-production in conventional school is different from the one occurring elsewhere by at least two 
mutually related accounts. 
First, in conventional schools, patterns to be recognized and produced are arbitrary4, most often lie 
outside of the immediate experiences of the learners and are not rooted in the everyday practices of the 
society outside of the schooling-testing industry. In extreme cases, the teacher can teach whatever 
nonsense the teacher wants to teach regardless of its truthfulness or usefulness – conventional schooling 
does not have a feedback loop with targeted practices that schooling is supposed to serve. In other words, 
conventional school is viewed as a near-perfect self-contained tool to shape students’ subjectivity in 
whatever way a teacher or the entire society wants or needs. That is why conventional schools in politically, 
socially, and economically different societies – whether totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic – look pretty 
 
4 Of course, this arbitrariness is relative to a student. Conventional schools’ curriculum is shaped by the powerful ideological 
hegemonies of the society. 
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much the same. The content of teaching (i.e., the curriculum) can be different at times – e.g., in the 
totalitarian Communist USSR, it was taught that mostly the Red Army won WWII, while in the democratic 
Capitalist US it was taught that mostly the US Army won WWII. However, the organization of educational 
practices is often very similar: quizzes, exams, lecturing, sitting silent, unconditional assignments, the 
unquestionable teacher authority, expulsions, and so on. In contrast, in many other practices and contexts, 
patterns to be recognized and produced are often pragmatic – not arbitrary – but embedded and 
subordinated to the practices and contexts themselves. There, what guides pattern-recognition and pattern-
production is success or failure in the pragmatics of the practice or context, mediated by the person’s own 
sense-making, rather than the arbitrary authority of the teacher or the society at large.  
Second, in conventional schools, the (dialogic) meaning-making process is subordinated to the 
pattern-recognition and production rather than the other way around. In conventional schools, a student’s 
own sense-making is often overruled by the teacher’s pattern of thinking, action, perception, and so on. It 
usually does not matter what makes sense for the student; what matters is what makes a good answer (for 
the teacher), good performance, good grade, and good mark produced by the teacher, testing agency, or 
society at large. The role of the student’s meaning-making is diligently to serve the latter. For example, a 
first-grader may sense that for some objects 2+2 is not always 4 (e.g., two friends and two friends does not 
always make four friends) (Matusov, 2009, Chapter 4; 2020, in press, Chapter 9) but this sensemaking is 
in contradiction with the school unconditional pattern that 2+2 is ALWAYS 4 when one counts the same 
things and one should not challenge it. At best, to be successful in a conventional school, a student may 
develop double-consciousness (Du Bois, 1961) to learn that in school 2+2 is always four, but outside of 
school, it may not be so. At worst, the student may be brainwashed into accepting the school pattern as 
always true. In-between, the student may give up on school success by rejecting the school pattern while 
remaining faithful to his/her own private sensemaking. In any case, the student’s private authorial 
sensemaking remains undeveloped by the critical public dialogue that is genuine education.  
One the other hand, the student’s authorial sensemaking can become a legitimate and public aide 
(facilitator) when it is subordinated to school pattern-recognition and pattern-production. If according to 
school pattern, 2+2 is always 4, then two hundred(s) plus two hundred(s) is four hundred(s) regardless of 
how perceptually confusing it may look to a child (Matusov, 2009, Chapter 4; 2020, in press, Chapter 9). A 
student is allowed to reason and make sense if and only if it leads to the authoritative school pattern, and 
the student’s reasoning is approved by the school authority. A student’s personal sense-making can also 
patch school patterns when they become obviously out of touch with reality by rationalizing the questionable 
school arbitrary patterns. For example, when I challenged my student who, based on a school science 
textbook, insisted that the Moon passes monthly the space between the Earth and the Sun, he agreed with 
me that according to this model, a solar eclipse would occur every month. He added that a solar eclipse 
happens every lunar month, but it just happens in different parts of the Earth and thus remains unregistered 
by most people. Conventional schools are often criticized that learning is decontextualized for their students 
(Forman, Minick, & Stone, 1993; Lave, 1988, 1992), which is, of course, true. But even more so, 
conventional school learning is de-ontologized5, de-personalized, voiceless, and stripped of any student 
activism and authorial agency by often colonizing the student, making them agentive (Milgram, 1974). 
Example of schoolish pattern-recognition and production in a science lesson 
In his book “Talking science” on science education in conventional school, researcher of science 
education Jay Lemke (1990) argues that this process of pattern-recognition and pattern-production occurs 
 
5 Of course, one can say that any learning is ontological in a sense that it is a part of the life of a student. But in conventional schools, 
it is not ontological with the regard of its content. Students often learn to please the teachers (and parents) rather than because they 
are genuinely interested in the academic content. 
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through and in a special pedagogical discourse. In conventional schools, students are guided by the teacher 
to learn to recognize and produce certain ready-made themes about science (or another academic subject) 
approved by the authority of the teacher (and tests, exams, and the broader society). Lemke argues that 
this learning goes much beyond rote memorization of vocabulary, procedures, or definitions but it is rather 
the recognition and production of holistic thematic patterns that involve certain beliefs, perceptions, actions, 
semantics, social relations, contexts, and power. Students not only learn to hear and talk about the pattern 
but also to see the world through and act by this discursive pattern. 
In his book “Talking science” on science education in conventional school, researcher of 
science education Jay Lemke (1990) argues that this process of pattern-recognition and pattern-
production occurs through and in a special pedagogical discourse. In conventional schools, students 
are guided by the teacher to learn to recognize and produce certain ready-made themes about 
science (or another academic subject) approved by the authority of the teacher (and tests, exams, 
and the broader society). Lemke argues that this learning goes much beyond rote memorization of 
vocabulary, procedures, or definitions but it is rather the recognition and production of holistic 
thematic patterns that involve certain beliefs, perceptions, actions, semantics, social relations, 
contexts, and power. Students not only learn to hear and talk about the pattern but also to see the 
world through and act by this discursive pattern. 
The science in the dialogue is not just a matter of vocabulary. Classroom language is not 
just a list of technical terms, or even just a recital of definitions. It is the use of those terms in relation 
to one another, across a wide variety of contexts. Students have to learn how to combine the 
meanings of different terms according to the accepted ways of talking science. They have to talk and 
write and reason in phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs of scientific language. 
… 
The pattern of connections among the meanings of words in a particular field of science I 
will call their thematic pattern. It is a pattern of semantic relationships that describes the thematic 
content, the science content, of a particular topic area. It is like a network of relationships among the 
scientific concepts in a field, but described semantically, in terms of how language is used in that 
field. There is science in the dialogue exactly to the extent that the semantic relationships and the 
thematic pattern built up by the dialogue reproduce the thematic pattern of language use in some 
field of science (Lemke, 1990, pp. 12-13). 
Lemke illustrates this pedagogical discursive process of the male teacher’s guiding his high school 
students into this pattern-recognition and pattern-production process by the following excerpt from a 
science lesson discourse about the quantum model of the atom: 
Before his first question, the teacher describes the diagram he has on the board (see Figure 
1.1). He points to the central area of the diagram and identifies it as "the 1 s orbital." He points out 
that the diagram does not show that it really looks like a sphere, that is, three- rather than two 
dimensional as it appears on the board. Only then does he ask a question which refers directly to the 
diagram, and not to the whole of it, but specifically to the part of it he has just described. He has 
prepared a context for his question first. Without the preparatory statements, the question would have 
been ambiguous or confusing for the class. (p. 6) 
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Figure 1: Atomic Orbital Diagram (Lemke, 1990, p. 6) 
Teacher: This is a representation of the one S . . . orbital. S'pozed to be, of course, three 
dimensional… What two elements could be represented by such a diagram? . 
. . Jennifer? 
Jennifer:  Hydrogen and helium? 
Teacher:  Hydrogen and helium. Hydrogen would have one electron... somewhere in 
there, and helium would have . . .? 
Student:  Two electrons. 
Teacher:  Two… This is… one S, and… the white would be…? Mark? 
Mark:  Two S. 
Teacher:  Two S. And the green would be…? Uhh… 
Janice:  Two P. Two P. 
Teacher:  Janice. 
Janice:  Two P. 
Teacher:  Two P. Yeah, the green would be 2P x and 2P y. (p. 5) 
In this excerpt, the students learn a discursive pattern regarding the quantum model of the atom by 
learning the correct way of talking about it through making the correct clarifications, correct inferences, and 
correctly answering the teacher’s questions. The teacher’s quizzing questions are aimed at testing the 
students’ existing understanding of the model but also at expanding this knowledge, which is nothing more 
but an intricate thematic pattern, as Lemke argues. Students may doubt or guess in their reply to the 
teacher’s quizzing questions as Jennifer did (“Hydrogen and helium?). Their answer can be not elaborated 
or incomplete, as in the case of Janice (it was not just 2P but 2Px and 2Py). It can be entirely correct, like 
in the case of Mark. Of course, it can be partially or even totally wrong, which was not presented in the 
excerpt. Lemke argues that the students learn not “doing science,” but “talking science” – production of 
correct discursive patterns. This recognition and production of correct discursive patterns arguably is similar 
to how Siri or Alexa produce and recognize “speech” on smart devices. 
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The mechanism of schoolish pattern-recognition 
Student semantic sprouting 
Pattern-recognition – the term emerged in German gestalt psychology (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1929) 
and was then actively used in computer science (Bishop, 2006) – involves the emergence or active 
production of diverse potential patterns that may or may not approximate the targeted phenomenon well 
(what I call “sprouting”). This sprouting can be guided (“supervised”) by an expert or unguided – near 
randomly produced (Sutton & Barto, 1998), mediated or unmediated. These diverse potential patterns are 
sequentially evaluated on how likely each of them can be close to the targeted pattern. In each evaluation, 
the probabilistic confidence of some patterns grows while that of some other patterns decreases. Strictly 
speaking, the winner pattern always remains probabilistic and never 100% certain as a new evaluation may 
change its probability to be the correct pattern. Evaluation of potential patterns involves an action, in which 
the potential patterns are tested against the targeted phenomenon. Often, the pattern-recognition includes 
many targeted patterns at once and is organized in a complex. For example, OCR (optical character 
recognition) that involves a program recognizing a scanned photo image of a text may include letter-pattern-
recognition, word-pattern-recognition, sentence-pattern, context-pattern-recognition, and so on (Bishop, 
2006; Sutton & Barto, 1998). One can argue that the modern computer-based pattern-recognition can be 
called “probabilistic cognitive behaviorism” as it is indifferent to goals, subjectivities, desires, rules, 
strategies, and so on and essentially based on “rewards” and “punishments” that change probabilistic 
weights for possible outcomes of a complex system.  
In conventional schools, students are active in sprouting out new semantic connections-inferences 
in the classroom subject-thematic discourse, as the students did in the excerpt in their response to the 
teacher’s lecture and questioning. Some of this semantic sprouting is done by the students privately while 
some publicly. Some students probably sprout the semantic connections when they were listening to the 
teacher’s lecture and watching the visual model of the atom (see Error! Reference source not found. 
above). The teacher’s mini-lecture promotes and provokes the students’ semantic sprouting. I agree with 
Lemke, “Without the preparatory statements, the [teacher’s initial] question would have been ambiguous or 
confusing for the class” (p. 6). We do not know how present, active, and deliberate this private process of 
semantic sprouting was for each and every student in the class. That is why, probably, a conventional 
teacher often seeks students’ public sprouting in public discourse. By asking challenging quizzing 
questions, the teacher promotes possible public sprouting through the students’ answers and silently in 
their heads.  
It is reasonable to assume that when Jennifer, Mark, Janice, and other students provide their replies 
to the teacher’s quizzing questions, they do not only publicly reveal their semantic sprouts-connections, 
privately produced in response to teacher’s mini-lecture (and prior discourse), but also they publicly make 
new semantic sprouts-connections. Also, their peers may continue producing their own semantic sprouts 
silently and privately in response to the teacher’s questions, their peers’ replies, the teacher’s evaluations 
and elaborations on the peer’s replies, and even their own discursive thinking. As to the nature of students’ 
semantic sprouting – how much it is emergent in reaction to other people’s (teachers’ and peer students’) 
discourse and demonstrations and how much it is based on deliberate actions on the part of the students 
– remains unclear and may differ from student to student.  
Immediate semantic sprouting involves perceptual and semantic pattern-recognition, described by 
cognitive psychologist Daniel Kahneman as System#1(2011). However, in contrast to Kahneman (and 
Vygotsky (1978)), I do not equate meaning-making with mediation. Kahneman seems to include non-
deliberate and unmediated pattern-recognition in his System#1 while including deliberate mediation in his 
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System#2. Since he equates meaning-making with mediation, meaning-making is also a part of his 
System#2. Although I agree that the meaning-making process involves mediation, it cannot be reduced to 
mediation (see my discussion of meaning-making below in this essay). I will discuss mediation later in the 
paper. 
Deliberate semantic sprouting involves internal dialogue, reasoning, and meaning-making, 
Kahneman’s System#2 (but not only, see, Matusov, 2017). Deliberate semantic sprouting also includes 
immediate semantic sprouting – in a way, deliberate semantic sprouting is always a hybrid – but the reverse 
is not always true: immediate semantic sprouting can be pure, without any deliberate sprouting. Probably 
(my hypothesis), more autodidactic, active learners generate more deliberate semantic sprouting, while 
more peripheral and passive students experience more immediate semantic sprouting. Since conventional 
schooling heavily promotes the former (immediate semantic sprouting) and discourages the latter 
(deliberate semantic sprouting), I expect the overall prevalence of immediate over deliberate semantic 
sprouting in conventional school6.  
Both pedagogical and psychological (indirect) evidence suggests that students’ semantic sprouting 
does exist but is never guaranteed. The students’ semantic sprouting exists even without the teacher’s 
direct instruction (lecturing, demonstration, and so on), without the teacher’s quizzing questions, without 
the teacher’s providing evaluative feedback and elaborations. It may be true that the students’ semantic 
sprouting is less likely to happen without the teacher’s guidance, although, for many students (but not in 
all!) it is not impossible (e.g., Nicol & Macfarlane-Dick, 2006). At the same time, the teacher’s guidance 
does not guarantee students’ sprouting, not in all students, not all the time, not a predictable type of 
sprouting. It is safe to assume that students’ semantic sprouting is unpredictable in each and every case. 
However, the teacher’s quizzing feedback provides cropping of wrong semantic sprouts to push the correct 
pattern-recognition and pattern-production. That is probably why classroom discourse involving the 
teacher’s quizzing and feedback is so ubiquitous in modern conventional school. 
Teacher’s approving and cropping of the students’ semantic sprouts – scaffolding 
One of the pedagogical roles of a conventional teacher is to crop out the students’ wrong semantic 
connections, approve and affirm the students’ correct semantic connections, clarify some of their fuzzy right 
connections, and encourage building still missing right connections through the triadic classroom discourse: 
1) Teacher’s quizzing question, 2) Student’s reply, 3) Teacher’s evaluation (Lemke, 1990; Mehan, 1979; 
Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975). To explicate the triadic discourse, the above exchange from Lemke’s study will 
look like: 
Teacher’s quizzing question: This is a representation of the one S . . . orbital. S'pozed to 
be, of course, three dimensional… What two elements could be represented by 
such a diagram? . . . Jennifer? 
Student’s response: Jennifer: Hydrogen and helium? 
Teacher’s evaluation and elaboration: Hydrogen and helium. Hydrogen would have one 
electron... somewhere in there… (p. 5) 
The student (Jennifer) was sprouting a semantic question-answer connection, although she was 
not sure whether her semantic connection to the teacher’s question was correct, from the teacher’s point 
of view. The teacher approved the student’s sprouting and elaborated on its justification (i.e., why the 
 
6 See my discussion below in this chapter. 
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pattern is correct) – mediated patterning, which may or may not mixed with genuine meaning-making for 
some particular students.  
In another example, the teacher cropped a student’s wrong sprout, 
Teacher’s quizzing question: If I have one electron in the 2Px, one electron in the 2Py, . . . 
two electrons in the 2S, two electrons in the 1S, what element is being 
represented by this configuration?... Ron? 
Student’s response: Ron: Boron? 
Teacher’s evaluation and mediation: That would be—That'd have uh . . . seven electrons. 
So, you'd have to have one here, one here, one here, one here, one here . . . 
one here—Who said it? you? 
The teacher tacitly rejected Ron’s answer and mediated his rejection by explanation of why the 
chemical element boron did not fit the pattern presented on the diagram. Other students provided the 
correct spouting accepted by the teacher, 
Student’s response: Carbon. 
Teacher’s quizzing question [beginning]: What's— 
Students’ response: Carbon! Carbon! 
Teacher’s evaluation and elaboration: Carbon. Carbon. Here. Six electrons. And they can 
be anywhere within those—confining—orbitals. (pp. 15, 17) 
The last exchange slightly deviated from the strict triadic discourse because the first student was 
making a response, unsanctioned by the teacher. Other students joined that student interrupting the 
teacher, who seemed to want to reiterate his previous question since Ron was wrong. The teacher 
sanctioned the student’s response by evaluating their answers as correct ones. The teacher accepted 
unsanctioned (unnamed) student’s response before. 
In conventional schools, at times, the teacher’s guidance of the students’ discursive pattern-
recognition and pattern-production goes far beyond direct instruction (e.g., lecture, demonstration) and the 
triadic discourse, described above. Psychologist Jerome Bruner and his colleagues (Bruner, Wood, & Ross, 
1976) describe the guidance employed in conventional schools as “scaffolding.” The goal of the scaffolding 
is for the teacher to actively lead the student to a curricular endpoint preset by the teacher in advance. In 
Lemke’s case, the preset curricular endpoint apparently was the quantum model of the atom (and, 
specifically, the atomic orbits of electrons in the atom). Rogoff argues that scaffolding involves much more 
than the organization of discourse but also the teacher’s management of the students’ motivation, 
frustration, and challenges7, the teacher’s presentation of the idealized pattern, and so on: 
1. Recruiting the child's interest in the task as it is defined by the tutor. 
2. Reducing the number of steps required to solve a problem by simplifying the task, so that the 
learner can manage components of the process and recognize when a fit with task 
requirements is achieved. 
3. Maintaining the pursuit of the goal, through the motivation of the child and direction of the 
activity. 
4. Marking critical features of discrepancies between what a child has produced and the ideal 
solution. 
 
7 Jim Cresswell, who read a previous version of this manuscript, made a comment, that I agree with, “I would say it is the teacher’s 
co-construction of these psychological predicates.” 
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5. Controlling frustration and risk in problem-solving. 
6. Demonstrating an idealized version of the act to be performed (Rogoff, 1990, p. 94). 
In Lemke’s excerpt above, #2, #4, and #6 of Rogoff’s principles of scaffolding are evident as the 
teacher breaks the quantum model of the atom into chunks by his quizzing questions (and probably in his 
lecturing) and by revealing possible discrepancies between the ideal model and the students’ replies via 
providing his evaluation of the students’ responses. Also, the quantum model of the atom remains idealized 
as it is simplified in certain aspects (e.g., from quantum mechanics’ point of view, strictly speaking, electrons 
do not have trajectories, and their “orbitals” represent probability distributions). The #1, #3, and #5 principles 
are not present, but they may occur outside of the excerpt.  
At the same time, Lemke’s extract has two additional aspects that are not present in Rogoff’s list: 
7) triadic discourse involving teacher’s quizzing question, student’s response, and teacher’s evaluation and 
elaboration; and 8) managing the discourse to make sure that the students’ replies are always sanctioned 
by the teacher. The list of essential features of scaffolding is probably incomplete, and the issue of how 
essential each of the aspects is remains open for future investigation. 
Now I want to turn to the issue of the contrast between conventional school pattern-recognition and 
pattern-production with: 1) pattern-recognition and production in everyday life, outside of conventional 
school, 2) learning guided by meaning-making rather than by pattern-recognition and production, and 3) 
the concept of genuine intrinsic education. 
Pattern-recognition/production in conventional school vs. everyday life 
I consider three dimensions that reveal the prevalent contrast between pattern-recognition and 
production in conventional school vs. in everyday life. These three dimensions involve: i) the relevance of 
the pattern-recognition/production for the students, ii) the ownership of the underlining values of the pattern, 
and iii) the realness of the pattern. I argue that in contrast to conventional school, the pattern-recognition 
and production process in everyday life is more often than not ontological rather than alienated (relevance), 
more authorial rather than technological (ownership), and more experiential rather than discursive 
(realness). I also consider progressive pedagogy as a pattern-recognition/production hybrid between 
conventional school and everyday life. 
Relevance: ontological vs. alienated 
Ontological8 pattern-recognition and production involve a person’s genuine interest in and/or 
genuine pragmatic need for this pattern. For example, a person who got a new remote control may search 
for new patterns of his or her actions with the new remote control leading to desired outcomes on the device 
associated with the remote control. In contrast to Lemke’s case above, in this case of the new remote 
control, the person’s motivation is rooted in the actor him/herself – his/her own ontology – and not in the 
teacher – in the teacher’s pedagogical actions, motivating the student. In everyday pattern-recognition and 
production, the pattern is often desired and owned by the actor, while in school, the pattern is demanded 
and, thus, imposed by the authority. Alienated pattern-recognition and production involve unconditional 
pleasing of the authority (Matusov, 2011a). This pleasing – the student’s desire to get the teacher to approve 
the pattern that emerges in or is actively designed by the student – guides the student’s pattern-recognition 
and production. The pleasing is unconditional because the student is not legitimately involved in the 
 
8 Theological-philosophical term “ontology” is very polysemic. I used it within an existential philosophical tradition as “being-in-the-
world.” 
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negotiation of what patterns he or she needs to recognize or produce. In conventional schools, a student 
does not have a legitimate voice in shaping the curriculum. 
Ownership: Authorial vs. technological 
Authorial pattern-recognition and pattern-production involve the actor’s attention, consideration, 
and approval of the values, defining the recognized and/or produced patterns’ success or failure. Bakhtin 
was similarly talking about putting one’s own signature under one’s deed (Bakhtin, 1993), taking 
responsibility for the value. In conventional school values, defining the patterns’ success and failure are 
firmly controlled and possessed by the authority (i.e., the teachers, the test designers, graders, 
governmental agencies imposing the prescribed curriculum). In the case of learning an unfamiliar remote 
control, the actor him/herself decides what outcome is desirable (e.g., switching on the TV) and whether it 
is successful or not. In conventional school, pattern-recognition and production is technological because 
the teacher, often being disinterested him/herself, treats the student as a tool to produce the pattern that 
the teacher pedagogically desires to produce. Authorial pattern-recognition and production promotes 
authorial learning (Matusov, 2011a), which organizational psychologists Argyris and Shon (1978) called 
Learning 2. Since authorial pattern-recognition and production is guided by the actor’s desires, owned by 
the actor, the actor has an opportunity to reflect on, revise, or even abandon the desire altogether. This is 
authorial learning or Learning 2. 
In contrast, in technological learning, the desire guiding the pattern-recognition and production 
process is owned by the authority and is essentially non-negotiable for the student. This type of situation 
promotes Learning 1, or thermostat-like learning, or deficit model learning, focusing on the gap between 
the ideal desired pattern, controlled by the teacher, and the student’s actual discursive or action-based 
performance as judged by the teacher (#4 on Rogoff’s list defining scaffolding).  
In authorial learning, Learning 2 and Learning 1 co-occur, with Learning 2 guiding the process. 
Analyzing everyday problem solving, Lave (1988) concluded that everyday problem solving (Learning 1) is 
often based on problem redefining (Learning 2). For example, while shopping for the cheapest cereal, a 
shopper may redefine the criterion for successful shopping by also considering space for storing the large 
box of the cheapest cereal and not only its price. The shopping process often involves redefining what 
exactly the shopper wants through considering the choices of the products available in the store and 
negotiation of what patterns he or she needs to recognize or produce. In conventional schools, a student 
does not have a legitimate voice in shaping the curriculum. 
Realness: Experiential vs. discursive 
Finally, experiential pattern-recognition and production involves a person’s holistic experience, 
rather than a discourse organized by the teacher that becomes the guiding force to form a desired 
perceptual or action-based pattern. Experiential pattern-recognition and production has “the reality check,” 
while discursive pattern-recognition and pattern-production does not. In the latter case, “the resistance of 
material” – i.e., what makes student’s perception and action right or wrong – is fully controlled by the school 
authority, which makes it arbitrary. In the extreme, the school can (and occasionally does) teach whatever 
nonsense – whatever untrue, irrelevant, and/or useless patterns to the students – it may wish (see Matusov, 
2020, in press, Chapter 2, for an example of such teaching).  
In contrast, in the former case, however arbitrary the actor’s desires may be (e.g., making the TV 
fly by pressing certain buttons on the TV), the realizations of these desires – i.e., patterns for desired actions 
– are never arbitrary because they are firmly grounded in the reality of the world. I call conventional 
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schoolish knowledge “conventional” (Matusov, 2009) because its truth is based on the conventional 
authority for the students: something is true because the teacher or textbook or school exam or scientists 
or powerful societal traditional norm say so. Below, I will elaborate on this point when I consider 
intersubjectivity. 
Saying all that, I want to nuance that, of course, in everyday life, there are many occasions for 
discursive pattern-recognition and pattern-production learning as well (e.g., learning a language). Also, 
experiential pattern-recognition and pattern-production can happen in conventional schools as well (e.g., 
lab science classes). Besides, discursive pattern-recognition and production may involve experiential 
aspects (e.g., semantic sprouting based on the student’s past experiences), while experiential pattern-
recognition and production may involve discursive aspects (e.g., symbols on a remote control or the remote 
control manual or verbal guidance by other people). Finally, there can be school-like situations in everyday 
life and everyday-life-like situations in conventional schools (Matusov, 2009). Nevertheless, the overall 
contrast of the dominance of ontological, authorial, and experiential aspects of pattern-recognition and 
production in everyday life and the supremacy of alienated, technological, and discursive pattern-
recognition and production in conventional school remains more or less intact, in my view. 
Progressive pedagogical education hybrid 
Progressive pedagogical9 education, represented by famous American educational philosopher 
John Dewey, tries to address the problem of irrelevance, alienation, and non-authenticity of the students’ 
school experiences by blending together conventional school and everyday pattern-recognition and 
production. Progressive pedagogy organizes instruction in the form of pragmatic experiential learning 
activities that funnel the students into the curricular endpoints preset by the society (i.e., “curricular 
standards”) – i.e., a body of democratically elected local and national political representatives of the general 
public, educational scholars and philosophers, and disciplinary scholars (i.e., scientists) (Dewey, 1956). It 
promotes the ontological and experiential nature of pattern-recognition and production in the learning 
activities from everyday practices.  
However, it preserves the control of the curriculum inherited in conventional schooling making the 
ownership of the patterns pseudo-authorial. It may feel like authorial at a local level of activities as students 
may have some freedom of defining their own values and set their own problems and goals in the learning 
activities, but eventually, the students’ values, problems, and goals have to be funneled into the curricular 
endpoints preset by the society. However, besides this preset curricular core, the students can arrive at 
their own emergent curricular endpoints, which can be considered as personalized, authorial, 
extracurricular enrichment and may involve meaning-making outside of the pattern-recognition and 
production requirement. 
Intersubjectivity 
Intersubjectivity is a social pattern of behavior involving subjectivity. The intersubjective pattern can 
be based on different types of behavioral coordination among individuals (Matusov, 1996). This 
coordination may include sameness. For example, an infant follows the mother’s outlook and, thus, sees 
what the mother sees (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985). Alternatively, intersubjective coordination may involve 
a transactional relationship. For example, when a male wolf, losing a fighting, switches to a submissive 
role, becoming intentionally defenseless, while the other, winning, wolf assumes a dominant role (instead 
 
9 The progressive pedagogical educational movement has to be distinguished from the progressive administrative educational 
movement. The latter focused on the organization of the institutional practices to make them more scientifically efficient and rational. 
The former focused on pedagogy to increase the relevance of pedagogical experiences for the students (Labaree, 2010). 
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of killing the defenseless rival) (Fogel, 1993). Or, it may involve a division of labor like in a modern 
enterprise. 
Intersubjectivity can be immediate or mediated. The latter can involve shared beliefs or individual 
coordinated calculations. Thus, for example, dual bicycle sprint race often starts with the rivals staying or 
slowly moving, refusing to take the lead10. The intersubjective pattern involves a complex calculation. An 
immediate lead often results in losing because the leading bicyclist would use more energy overcoming the 
resistance of the air while the closely following bicyclist would save energy. However, this also depends on 
the distance between the bicyclists, their positions on the tracks, how far they are from the finish line, and 
so forth. In this case, the intersubjectivity is not only highly mediated by the bicyclists’ calculations but also 
dynamic leading to diverse patterns.  
Intersubjectivity does not only coordinate people but also creates a new socially constructed reality. 
For example, money is based on intersubjectivity. 
Intersubjective entities depend on communication among many humans rather than on the 
beliefs and feelings of individual humans. Many of the most important agents in history are 
intersubjective. Money, for example, has no objective value. You cannot eat, drink or wear a dollar 
bill. Yet as long as billions of people believe in its value, you can use it to buy food, beverages and 
clothing. If the baker suddenly loses his faith in the dollar bill and refuses to give me a loaf of bread 
for this green piece of paper, it doesn’t matter much. I can just go down a few blocks to the nearby 
supermarket. However, if the supermarket cashiers also refuse to accept this piece of paper, along 
with the hawkers in the market and the salespeople in the mall, then the dollar will lose its value. The 
green pieces of paper will go on existing, of course, but they will be worthless (Harari, 2017). 
As Harari points out, intersubjectivity won’t evaporate if a person stops believing in this socially 
constructed reality. The life of such an individual will become very difficult. By disbelieving in the 
intersubjective reality, the individual would disrupt it for other people, and the other people will push back 
the spoilsport11. 
The social fabric of conventional education is entirely intersubjective. For example, in my graduate 
classes, sometimes I ask my students out of the blue, “What is two plus two?” Without exception, my 
students reply, “Four.” This is even though my question was out of any immediate context of our class 
discussion. Also, my students know perfectly well that I know what two plus two is – they know that this is 
not an information-seeking question but rather a form of a teacher’s quizzing. Interesting enough, when I 
asked some of them the same question outside of the class when we bumped into each other on a campus 
street or at a campus café, they never reply to me “four.” Often, my students become confused, asking me 
to repeat the question, “What?” or “Why?!”12 They seem to want to know why I asked this strange, out 
context, question.  
My little experiment reveals conventional school’s intersubjectivity of socially constructed reality 
where a teacher can ask quizzing questions at will, abruptly, and out of context. The power of this 
 
10 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAhlewcOxAI  
11 Ana Marjanovic-Shane (2016) argues that genuine (dialogic meaning-making) education is based on spoilsports’ deconstruction of 
the culturally given intersubjectivity. Students have to be placed in a position of such spoilsports. 
12 You can watch a video fragment that shows reactions of adults after being asked schoolish, quizzing, questions outside of school 
context. People are confused, puzzled, disoriented, or laughing when are faced with schoolish questions in everyday life: 
https://youtu.be/uv1O62T8lmg  
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intersubjectivity is very strong. Even if I told my students about my experiment in the classroom and then 
asked them what two plus two is, they revealed that it was very difficult for them to resist not to say “four.” 
Obviously, they do not have this problem outside of the classroom. Intersubjectivity creates powerful 
“psychological affordances” (Gibson, 1979) – i.e. when a particular pattern of the environment or a particular 
situation forces an individual’s actions even despite their will. 
As I showed in the section above, teaching science (and other academic subjects) in conventional 
schools is mostly about the teacher’s socialization of students in intersubjective socially constructed reality 
through a pattern-recognition and pattern-construction. Harari (2017) comments, “People constantly 
reinforce each other’s [intersubjective] beliefs in a self-perpetuating loop. Each round of mutual confirmation 
tightens the web of meaning further until you have little choice but to believe what everyone else believes.” 
As I will show below, individual or intersubjective, immediate or mediated, charged with psychological 
affordances or not, self-sufficient or embedded in webs of activities and relationships, behavioral and 
subjective patterns are not really meanings. They can become meanings only when they enter a sphere of 
dialogue. 
Dialogic meaning-making vs. pattern-recognition/production in education 
According to the Russian philosopher of dialogism Mikhail Bakhtin, meaning-making is dialogic. 
Dialogic meaning-making is defined as the relationship between a genuine, interested, information-seeking, 
question, and serious response to it (Bakhtin, 1986, 1999). This dialogic definition of meaning-making is 
dramatically different from a common monologic understanding of meaning-making. From a conventional 
monological point of view, meaning is located in a particular statement or rooted in a word, or in a gesture, 
or in a tool, or in a mediation (Mead, 1956; Vygotsky, 1978). From the Bakhtinian dialogic perspective, a 
statement/word/gesture/tool/mediation does not have any meaning until it is viewed as a reply to some 
question (in a broader sense as puzzlement, perplexity, tension, interrogation, inquiry, wonderment, and so 
on)13.  
For example, often a mathematical statement like 2+2=4 is viewed as meaningful because it tacitly 
replies to a question, “How much is 2 plus 2?” But in this case, the 2+2=4 is really meaningful only if the 
question, “How much is 2 plus 2?” is a genuine, interested, information-seeking question, which is probably 
not the case for most or all of my readers. The meaning of my 2+2=4 statement for me is answering my 
own genuine question of what an example of dialogic meaning-making can be. However, my readers may 
imagine a different genuine, interested, information-seeking question behind my use of 2+2=4 example, 
and, in this case, they may have their own meaning, different from mine.  
Also, my (and other people’s) meaning-making may not need to be stable as we can come up with 
different questions while re-reading 2+2=4 in “the same text” (thus, the text never remains the same). 
Although not necessarily language-based, meaning-making is always discursive and rooted in language. 
In a speech- and language-rich environment, human actions and silences find their discursive properties of 
raising and addressing questions to others. Although not necessarily always literally (physically) collective 
– as meaning-making can occur in one person during an internal dialogue or when reading others’ written 
texts – meaning-making is an inherently social phenomenon. Any internal or imaginary dialogue within or 
by one person is always a purified and reduced genuine dialogue among real, living, people, who can 
genuinely (not imaginarily!) reply on their own behalf (Lobok, 2012, 2014; Matusov, 2009; Nikulin, 1998, 
2006, 2010; Sidorkin, 1999). Opaqueness of the replying and addressing consciousness of the Other, 
 
13 Actually, Vygotsky also has an example of how a statement “the watch fell” may mean two entirely different things based on what 
questions it is answering (Vygotsky & Kozulin, 1986). This is one of the times where he comes close to discussing dialogic meaning-
making, in my view. 
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taking responsibility, interaddressivity, – are a few issues among many others that distinguish internal or 
imaginary dialogue from genuine dialogue with other people. 
From an educational practice perspective, a student’s meaning-making process starts with a 
genuine, interested, information-seeking question raised by the student, not by the teacher. At least, when 
a student cannot yet formulate this genuine question, they have to be pregnant with such a question, 
experiencing a certain puzzlement, uneasiness, curiosity, tension, and so on. Without a genuine question 
or at least puzzlement, uneasiness, curiosity, or tension, a student cannot be involved in a meaning-making 
process (Berlyand, 2009; Bibler, 2009) – and therefore cannot be involved in education. Provoking such 
types of questions in students is proto-teaching, preparation for teaching.  
Socrates’ dialogues, with the exception of his dialogue with a slave in Meno, started with students 
asking genuine questions (Matusov, 2009). That is why I argue that there is little visible evidence of the 
meaning-making process in Lemke’s excerpt from a conventional science lesson above. Even when 
meaning-making may occur there, like in the student’s (Jennifer) question, “Hydrogen and helium?”, it is 
not clear how genuine, interested, and information-seeking, this question was for Jennifer. And even if so, 
her meaning-making was probably subordinated to her pattern-recognition to please the teacher. A full-
blown meaning-making process, transcending the given, does not know preset curricular endpoints, 
educational standards, as its goal. The meaning-making process disrupts the given curricular standards 
and endpoints. It is wild and unpredictable (Lobok, 2001, 2012). It does not bow to any authority (cf. Bakhtin, 
1991). It is bottomless (Bakhtin, 1986). It is unfinalizable in time and in principle as more and more questions 
can be raised, and different replies can be given (Nikulin, 2010). 
Students’ meaning-making is a social process that may require a teacher’s, peers’ and other 
people’s help. Let’s consider the following case of an emergent dialogic meaning-making process among 
elementary school fourth-grade students in a typing class: 
A primary consideration in developing a community of inquiry is to give students ownership 
of the tasks and problems posed. Throughout the year, many mathematical investigations grew out 
of students' questions and observations from mathematics class, other subject areas, personal 
experiences, and children's literature. The following conversation prompted us to engage the 
students in a rich exploration in finding patterns in rational numbers. The students were working on 
a computer-assisted spelling program that reported individual results as a statement, such as "19 
correct out of 20 or 95%." 
Thom: I only missed one this time! [His report showed that he got 15 correct out of 16, or 94%.] 
Will: Me, too! I got a 95. [He points to the screen and shows the other student. His report says 
that he got 19 correct out of 20, or 95%.] 
Thom: Hey, why did you get a 95 when I got a 94? We both only missed one. That's not fair! 
Will: I think your computer is broken. 
… 
To begin our investigation, Thom and Will shared their conversation about their spelling 
scores. Some students agreed that the computer must have made an error; others thought that the 
computer could be right, but they were not sure why the percents were different. Although some 
students thought that the magnitude of the numbers might contribute to different percents, most of 
the students' conversation focused on the difference between the number of words spelled correctly 
and the total number of words. To prompt the students to explore the problem further, I posed the 
following question: “Suppose that you took a spelling test with only two words on it and you misspelled 
one of them. The computer reports that you got one word correct out of two. What percent of the 
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words did you get correct?" The students discussed this question for several minutes with their "math 
buddies." When asked to share, one pair of students responded that 1 out of 2 was 50 percent 
because only half the words were correct, and 50 percent means half. Other students chimed in and 
nodded agreement. We pointed out that 1 out of 2 means that you missed only one word, just as 
Thom got 15 out of 16 and Will got 19 out of 20. We then asked why the percent scores were different. 
Sheila: Ninety-five percent means that you almost got all the words correct. So, 15 but of 16 and 
19 out of 20 should both be 95 percent, since you almost have all the words correct. 
Teacher. Do you think that 1 out of 2 should also be 95 percent? 
Sheila: One out of 2 is usually 50 percent, but it also could be 95 percent, since you almost have 
all the words correct. 
John:  No, 1 out of 2 is always 50 percent because 1 is half of 2 and half of something is 50 
percent, just like 50 cents is always half of a dollar. 
John, and most others, had a clear understanding that 1 out of 2 was always 50 percent; 
however, they were not able to reason why the three ratios resulted in different percents (Drier, 2000, 
p. 359). 
Please note that here it was students Thom and Will and not their teacher who initiated the genuine 
question, inquiry, and puzzlement for themselves and the class (but not necessary for the teacher who 
might feel that she knew the answer). However, in a dialogic meaning-making pedagogy, a teacher can 
provoke students’ questions, inquiries, and puzzlements. It was OK for the teacher to recognize this math 
inquiry raised by the students as a legitimate learning problem during a language-arts lesson. Meaning-
making does not know academic subject boundaries or, actually, any boundaries – Bakhtin (1986) called 
this feature of the dialogic meaning-making process “heterodiscoursia,”14 literally “a diversity of ways of 
speaking, ” “a diversity of discourses.” Another important aspect of the full-blown dialogic meaning-making 
process is that it is not and cannot be validated by an authority (e.g., the teacher) but only by the discourse 
itself. Bakhtin (1991) called it “internally persuasive discourse,” contrast to “authoritative discourse” (e.g., 
of a conventional school) where validations of contributions come exclusively from the authority. However, 
my colleague and I argue that in this discourse, the internal of its persuasion and validation come from the 
discourse itself – it is internal to the discourse itself – and not to the individual (i.e., internal to the individual 
mind) (Matusov & von Duyke, 2010). In an internally persuasive discourse, each and every participant 
remains the only legitimate judge for themselves of how much each meaning-making contribution is valid 
or contested. Of course, this authorial judgment is never final and remains challenged by authorial 
judgments by other people now or in the future. 
The third important feature of the internally persuasive meaning-making discourse is that the 
outcomes of the discourse, viewed by the participants as always provisional, are unpredictable and can 
lead in many directions. In the given case, the computer (and, apparently, the teacher) accessed spelling 
accuracy by the proportion of correct words to total words. This mathematical model was based on many 
questionable assumptions apparently rejected by Thom, Will, and Sheila. Thus, this mathematical model 
implied that all mistakes were the same. However, imagine that a student made a spelling mistake and 
learned from it, avoiding a similar mistake in the future. In this case, arguably, a student’s spelling accuracy 
becomes 100%, since a student becomes perfect at spelling. In another case, that of a spelling bee 
competition, making one mistake means that the contestant has lost the competition – it does not matter 
when it occurred and with how many words. It is either 100% or 0%. 
 
14 Unfortunately, in the English translation, a wrong term, “intertextuality”, was used for the Russian term “raznorech’e” (“разноречье”) 
(Todorov, 1984). I introduced a better translation “heterodiscoursia” in a parallel to another Bakhtinian term “heteroglossia” 
(“разноголосье”) that was well-translated in English (Matusov, 2011b). 
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The computer’s (and the teacher’s) math model implies, among other things, the spelling accuracy 
continuity – i.e., if a student makes one mistake out of 2 words, for example, he or she will continue making 
mistakes with the same frequency of 50%. Of course, this is very questionable. A student who made one 
mistake out of 20 (like Will) might continue not making spelling mistakes for the next 1,000 words (or not) 
or may start learning from his mistakes. From this perspective, students who made just one mistake were 
equally accurate regardless of how many words they wrote. This is what Thom, Will, and Sheila seemed to 
imply to me. Unfortunately, the teacher did not investigate their assumptions that require different math 
models from the one that both the computer and the teacher used. John’s position was unclear to me and 
also seemed not to have been explored by the teacher. This leads me to conclude that this dialogic 
meaning-making process was rather limited and a bit unguided. 
As the case suggests, dialogic meaning-making may not guarantee any productive outcome, 
however provisional it may be. It may flexibly dissolve any particular thematic focus (Nikulin, 2006, 2010). 
In this particular case, we do not know how much the teacher respected this principle of the full-blown 
dialogic meaning-making process – she might or might not funnel the discursive process to her preset 
curricular point. If she did, she would be a progressive educator, subordinating and exploiting the students’ 
dialogic meaning-making for the pattern-recognition process (see above).  
Although patterns of perception, patterns of action, patterns of communication, patterns of relation, 
patterns of power, patterns of thinking, and so on can become a subject of dialogic meaning-making, there 
is an essential difference between patterns and dialogic meaning as such in, at least, two important aspects. 
First, in the dialogic meaning-making process, people are not only genuinely, ontologically, interested in it 
– resolving some question, tension, puzzlement, inquiry, and so on – but also in other people: 1) in what 
other people may think and how they feel about it; however these people define this it, and 2) in other 
people as such – in what they are doing, feeling, relating, and thinking about; in the relationship with these 
people; in the potential that these people may realize and offer; and so on (Nikulin, 2006, 2010). I called 
this aspect of dialogic meaning-making “interaddressivity” – i.e., genuine and deep interest in the people’s 
dialogic interlocutors (Matusov, 2011b).  
The interaddressive interest in it vs. in people, i.e., in one’s dialogic partners, may vary and can 
create an important tension in a dialogic meaning-making process. In contrast, pattern-recognition is always 
concerned with it – would it be things, processes, behaviors, or even people. Pattern-recognition does not 
address or reply – meaning-making does.  
Second, in pattern-recognition, one tries to grasp the complete form of things, processes, 
behaviors, actions, perceptions, and events – i.e., finalize them. As with creating any form, one finalizes 
and conceives of the pattern as finalizable, even when this form of the pattern is probabilistic (e.g., a 
probabilistic pattern of winning in a lottery) – a pattern of probability. Pattern-recognition is exhaustible and 
has its bottom. 
In contrast, meaning-making is relational (i.e., the relation between the genuine question and 
serious answer), bottomless, inexhaustible, unfinalized, and unfinalizable in principle (Bakhtin, 1986; 
Nikulin, 2006, 2010). Pattern can become meaningful only when it is dialogized. In sum, pattern-recognition 
per se is essentially monologic, while meaning-making is essentially dialogic. 
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Conclusion: Pattern-recognition/production and dialogic meaning-making vs. 
education 
Finally, I want to address the question of how the monologic pattern-recognition/production 
pedagogies and the dialogic meaning-making pedagogies are situated within the practice of education. 
Both pattern-recognition/production and meaning-making processes are often present in both monologic 
and dialogic pedagogies. However, these processes play different roles in each pedagogy. In the 
monologic, conventional and innovative, dialogic meaning-making, if it occurs at all, is subordinated to the 
emergence of the “correct” pattern – correct from either the authority’s point of view or/and from the 
pragmatic point of view. In the dialogic pedagogies, pattern-recognition/production is subordinated to this 
meaning-making. I think that all pedagogies are a pattern-meaning hybrid, which may have both forces at 
play. Prioritization of one of these two aspects defines the nature of the pedagogy. 
I argue that the monologic pattern-recognition/production pedagogies are mainly concerned with 
and primarily focused on the reproduction of and socialization in existing, ready-made, culture, and specific 
cultural practices. The alienated pattern-recognition of conventional school approaches this task by 
chunking the ready-made culture into self-contained basic skills (e.g., reading, writing, calculating), basic 
prescribed knowledge, and basic dispositions. The students’ authorial agency is postponed until their 
education is “completed” (Matusov, von Duyke, & Kayumova, 2016). Some educators call this type of 
education – “training” (e.g., Dearden, 1984). In contrast, the innovative pattern-recognition of progressive 
school approaches this task by engaging the students in ontologically attractive learning activities that are 
a funnel to carefully preselected holistic ready-made cultural practices. My colleague Ana Marjanovic-
Shane and I called this type of education – “closed participatory socialization in a targeted cultural practice” 
(Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012). We call it “socialization” because, in contrast to training, it views the 
ready-made practice holistically, involving the participants’ social relations and identities. We call this 
socialization “closed” because it does not see students’ potential or actual contributions to transform, 
modify, or transcend this ready-made cultural practice as legitimate. 
The dialogic meaning-making pedagogies are interested in transcending existing ready-made 
practices, relations, and communities of practices and in creating new ones through creative dialogic 
meaning-making by raising questions, concerns, issues, inquiries, curiosities, problems, challenges, 
controversies, and so on (Kovbasyuk & Blessinger, 2013). The dialogic meaning-making pedagogies are 
authorial as they expect and legitimize students’ authorship in making culture.  
Ana Marjanovic-Shane and I (2012) distinguish at least two major dialogic meaning-making 
pedagogies. We called one “open participatory socialization” because it mainly focuses on the successful 
and creative socialization of the students in existing and innovative practices, while this socialization 
remains open for the student’s authorial inputs and contributions. In open participatory socialization, 
students can legitimately transcend the practice, in which they socialize. This education involves culture-
making – construction of a new practice – rather than culture reproduction. It prioritizes creative authorship 
in the students. 
We call the other dialogic meaning-making pedagogy “critical dialogue” because it mainly focuses 
on critical examination of the existing and new self, culture, world, practices, and society, while it views 
open participatory socialization as its by-product. It promotes critical authorship in the students. We 
presented all four pedagogies in the following table (I slightly updated this table by adding the new, third, 
column on types of pedagogy and by adding references in the second column): 
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Table 1: Diverse approaches to education (based on Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012, p. 165) 
Approaches to 
education 
Example Types of pedagogy Curriculum Instruction/guidance 
Alienated 
Learning 
Often conventional 
schooling 
Pattern-
recognition/ 
production 
(alienated, 
technological, 
discursive)  
Poiesis: 
reproduction 
of ready-
made culture 
Poiesis 
Closed 
Participatory 
Socialization 
“Imitative 
participation”, 
progressive 
education, 
appropriation of the 
ready-made culture 
(Van Oers, 2012; 
Vygotsky, 1978) 
Pattern-
recognition/ 
production 
(ontological, 
pseudo authorial, 
experiential) 
Poiesis: 
reproduction 
of ready-
made culture 
Praxis 
Open 
Participatory 
Socialization 
“Community of 
practice”, 
“legitimate 
peripheral 
participation” (Lave 
& Wenger, 1991; 
Wenger, 1998) 
Dialogic meaning-
making (creative) 
Praxis: 
production 
of culture 
Praxis 
Critical 
Dialogue 
“Dialogic Education 
For Authorial 
Agency” (Matusov, 
Smith, Soslau, 
Marjanovic-Shane, & 
von Duyke, 2016) 
Dialogic meaning-
making (critical) 
Praxis of 
praxis: 
critical 
stance on 
culture 
Praxis 
As I stated above, we used Aristotelian notions of “poiesis” and “praxis” to characterize curriculum 
and instruction in these four types of pedagogy (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006). Poiesis refers to an activity, in 
which its goal and the definition of quality preset (standards) and preexist the activity itself. In contrast, 
praxis refers to an activity, in which its goal and the definition of quality emerges in the activity itself. Thus, 
alienated pattern-recognition/production of conventional school involves poiesis of both standardized 
curriculum and standardized instruction as both of them are preset in advance. “Standardized social and 
cultural behavior patterns limit creative and authentic communication between individuals and groups” 
(Dumazedier, 1974, p. 72).  
When instrumentalism, servility, efficiency, survival, and necessities take over and are prioritized, 
they become enemies of true democracy, true dialogue, true education, and true self-realization. In a 
pattern-recognition/production pedagogy of closed participatory socialization in progressive schooling, the 
curriculum remains poiesis while instruction becomes authorial praxis. In a dialogic meaning-making 
pedagogy of open participatory socialization, both curriculum and instruction become praxis. Finally, in a 
dialogic meaning-making pedagogy of critical dialogue, instruction remains praxis while curriculum 
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becomes “praxis of praxis” – i.e., critical examination of life (cf. Socrates' motto, "The unexamined life is not 
worth living," Plato & Riddell, 1973).  
In my upcoming book (Matusov, 2020, in press), I argue that only the latter should be the legitimate 
overall goal of genuine education. One may argue that by this statement, defining the goal of genuine 
education, I made education practice close and finalized – i.e., poiesis-like, in contradiction to my previous 
claims that genuine education should be praxis-like, in which its goal has to emerge in the activity itself. 
However, in my view, my definition of genuine education is self-deconstructive because it involves a critical 
examination of education itself as an aspect of one’s life (and critical exanimation of the criticality itself – its 
limitations). 
But the question still remains: why is the alienated pattern-recognition/production pedagogy of 
conventional schooling so prevalent in the past and present of our society15? Standards-based schooling 
teaches students conventional knowledge that arguably constitutes “cultural capital” (Hirsch, 1996), creates 
hegemonic consensuses in the society (Gee, 1996), and prepares workers for their future workplaces that 
require these standards and mental templates (Labaree, 1997). Arguably, conventional knowledge can help 
people achieve success in practices without it being dialogically persuasive. One does not need to know 
all reasons for conventional knowledge being correct (leave it to the experts!) to enjoy its fruits – at the end 
of the day, what matters is to act correctly in some objective way, and this will carry success in practice. 
Although this attitude can be highly pragmatic and useful, it is anti-educational. I do not say that educational 
concerns should always be prioritized over pragmatic ones, but I argue that it is important to distinguish 
pragmatic concerns from educational and not confuse pragmatic utility of training with genuine education. 
The mainstream education is based on the utilitarian claim that standards are the basis and the cornerstone 
of our modern society. 
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